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SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: UNAMID PEACEKEEPERS NEED A PEACE TO KEEP,  
JSR ADADA TELLS SE GRATION

¶1. (SBU) Summary: UNAMID, the joint AU/UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur, "needs a peace to keep," Joint Special Representative (JSR) Adada told Presidential Special Envoy Gration in a meeting at UNAMID Headquarters in El Fasher, North Darfur on April 4. UNAMID has now deployed 67 percent of its forces to Darfur. The challenge it now faces is to complete this deployment and achieve the fully authorized level of 20,000-plus troops on the ground. Adada said that UNAMID has been criticized for standing helplessly at the edge of an "intractable conflict," but he added that its plan for a mobile monitoring team (MMT) requires a ceasefire. With the region facing a humanitarian crisis, UNAMID asked for greater US support with UN New York. As one senior administrator put it, "If anything goes wrong, we will be blamed." End summary.

¶2. (SBU) With the heads of UNAMID offices assembled at UNAMID HQ's modest conference room, JSR Adada told Special Envoy Gration that the US plays a crucial role in UNAMID, not only as member of the Security Council, but also as the leader of the Friends of UNAMID. Fourteen months since taking over from the AU mission in Darfur, Adada said that the main challenges continue to be deployment and the lack of a peace agreement. With deployment standing at 67 percent, UNAMID will face significant challenges bringing deployment up to the authorized 20,000-plus troop strength. Reducing violence will require the full implementation of a cessation of hostilities among all parties in Darfur. Adada announced that UNAMID's plan for a mobile monitoring team (MMT) is ready when needed. Expressing hope for more opportunities to work together, Adada said that the "primary interest" of all parties involved in Darfur should be pushing Darfuris and their representatives to negotiations in Doha. "A real peacekeeping mission needs a peace to keep," he said.

¶3. (SBU) Abdul Mohammed, UNAMID political chief and head of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC - created by the Darfur Peace Agreement,) told SE Gration and his delegation that politics in Sudan have been overwhelmed by the March 4 announcement of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir. The ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has forced all political actors to take a stance on the issue, impeding opposition rebel movements from engaging in peace talks, while simultaneously stifling political discourse. The "low-intensity war" that pervades Darfur results from the same "politics of drift" that hold hostage the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and with a regime unable to make any significant decisions, Mohammed ticked off a list of forboding concerns. "If the Sudanese government intends to unleash the Arab militias again, then we will see a situation similar to that of 2004. We should not rule out an IDP uprising in response to deteriorating conditions in the camps. At present, Darfur is showing all the signs of becoming an intractable conflict which will not be susceptible to mediation." Now more than in the previous three years, according to Mohammed, Darfur requires an international strategic approach to "manage the unmanageable."

14. (SBU) UNAMID Civil Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs, and Human Rights officials all expressed similar concerns that recent developments threaten to undo previous positive changes that took place prior to the March 4 expulsion by the regime of 13 international NGOs. With the recent arrival of approximately 40,000 IDPs to Zam Zam IDP camp, UN partners and the remaining NGOs have taken measures that are capable of patching over the humanitarian gap caused by the expulsions only until the end of April. A UNAMID Humanitarian Affairs officer noted no improvements in food security in Darfur had occurred since the beginning of the year. UNAMID Human Rights and Rule of Law officers noted ongoing problems in Darfur, including: pervasive impunity for organized violence; lack of criminalization of sexual violence; ineffective justice accountability mechanisms; and intermittent access to courts and lawyers for victims. Regarding the GOS Special Prosecutor for Crimes in Darfur, appointed in September 2008 with much fanfare by the GOS, director of UNAMID Human Rights Maria Therese-Kelte noted, "We don't know much about the special prosecutor or what he does."

15. (SBU) UNAMID Chief of J5 Plans Col. Noddy Stafford told SE Gration that while UNAMID has now deployed 67 percent of its planned troop strength, it does not yet operate at 67 percent capacity due to shortages in contingent-owned equipment and an eight-percent shortfall in pledged contributions to the entire mission. However, he said that UNAMID's coverage in Darfur is increasing, as peacekeepers are conducting over 100 patrols of more than 70 peacekeepers per day, and Formed Police Units (FPUs), currently operating at only 31 percent capacity, will achieve their full 2900-officer capacity by November 2009. Although UNAMID peacekeepers will continue to deploy in April and May, Stafford believed that Darfur's rainy season will bog down major new

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deployments until late summer.

16. (SBU) Drafted with suggestions from the US in mind, UNAMID's plan for a Mobile Monitoring Team (MMT) envisions one team of 15-20 personnel for each Darfuri state. Party representatives to a ceasefire will be invited at the discretion of the Force Commander and Sector Commanders, and the investigation and verification of violations to the ceasefire would be conducted within 24 hours. In addition to requiring dedicated helicopter transport, extensive training and non-military logistic support, a successful MMT can operate only with full cessation of hostilities, something UNAMID officers admitted will remain a challenge in the short- and medium-terms.

17. (SBU) Thanking the assembled officers for their briefing, SE Gration asked if there was anything he could do to assist their work and the implementation of UNAMID's mandate. JSR Adada reiterated that the US has a major role to play in bringing partners to the negotiating table, and in following up on UNAMID's plan to implement the MMT with UNHQ. D/JSR Henry Anyidoho said that the newest crisis to address in Darfur is humanitarian in nature. While UNAMID does not have a humanitarian mandate, it clearly sees the possibility of a major humanitarian crisis. If the latter should occur, Anyidoho said that UNAMID would be blamed regardless of its mandate. He asked that the US assist UNAMID by raising this concern in Washington and New York.

18. (SBU) The meeting ended with an extended discussion on deployment issues. The deployment method of the 2nd Ethiopian battalion (scheduled to arrive in Darfur in April after traveling in a massive self-contained convoy by road from Addis Ababa) is yet to be decided because UNHQ cannot reimburse Ethiopia for more than it would cost to pay a contractor for such a move. Such an operation would speed deployment and all agreed that despite the dispute over costs currently underway at UNHQ, such an immediate deployment would be well-worth whatever Addis Ababa has asked. Adada asked SE Gration for US help in facilitating the overland deployment. Additionally, several officers asked that the US discuss infrastructure problems in Darfur with the GOS as a way to improve deployment - for example Sudanese railroad trains carrying contingent-owned equipment (COE) from El Obeid generally will derail 20 times before reaching its destination in Nyala. Parts for these trains are detained in Germany

because of US sanctions (the train also carries equipment for SAF in Darfur in addition to UNAMID).

¶9. (SBU) Comment: As Darfur continues in an extended phase of "an almost intractable conflict," UNAMID requires tools and weapons not currently in its arsenal - namely attack and transport helicopters. For an MMT to become fully operational, a cessation of hostilities must be negotiated. However, UNAMID could begin more rapidly to monitor violence and fighting through negotiating a protocol with the government to start such monitoring. This could be done even in the absence of a formal ceasefire. However, UNAMID will likely need a request from the US to do so. A creative solution to allow the 2nd Ethiopian Battalion to deploy rapidly overland is urgently required. Such a solution might entail the US paying the extra cost of the deployment on a non-reimbursable basis, after negotiating the total cost with Ethiopia. Post requests S/USSES and US/UN to review for possible US assistance. End comment.

FERNANDEZ